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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
disagree as to what is reasonable cause."' The reasonableness
of the
12
objection may be tested by motion for an injunction.
The courts have not attempted to define the degree of proof of
materiality necessary to sustain the subpoena under the statute. It
is submitted that in order to carry out the intent of the legislature
in the light of the remedy it has attempted to supply and in order
not to unduly hamper the Attorney-General in his investigations, the
burden should be placed on the petitioner to prove the obvious irrelevancy of the information demanded or the inevitability of failure
to discover anything material to the investigation. 3
J.E. H.

MORTGAGES-EFFECT

OF

WRONGFUL

DEMAND

FOR

RENT

BY

REcEIVER.-Landlord and tenant entered into a long term lease under
which the latter was to pay the rent for the first year in advance.
After the tenant was in possession for several months, a suit was
brought to foreclose a mortgage to which the lease was subordinate.
A receiver was appointed. He demanded of tenant, as rent, the
value for the use and occupation of the premises and, upon being
refused, obtained an order of the court to evict tenant. The latter,
accepting eviction, constructively vacated by giving up his rights
under the lease and thereafter entered into a new lease with the
receiver. Plaintiff, successor to the rights of the mortgagee, moved
to set aside the order to vacate on the ground that the court had
no jurisdiction to grant said order. The plaintiff seeks to restore
the status quo under the old lease. Held, .the receiver's wrongful
demand for rents and tenant's subsequent vacating of possession terminates the lease leaving parties open to negotiate a new contract.
" Ibid.
12 Dunham v. Ottinger, supra note 2.
It has been held that the court has
no jurisdiction to question the validity of a subpoena issued under the statute
on petition alone. The proper procedure is an action for injunctive relief.
Matter of Marcus, Matter of Horvatt, both supra note 3.
"Cardozo, C. J., discussed the problem in the case of In re Edge Ho
Holding Corporation, 256 N. Y. 374, 176 N. E. 537 (1931): "The powers
devolved * * * will be rendered to a large extent abortive if his subpoenas are
to be quashed in advance of any hearing at the instance of unwilling witnesses
upon forecasts of the testimony and nicely balanced arguments as to its probable
importance. Very often the bearing of information is not susceptible of
intelligent estimate until it is placed in its setting, a tile in the mosaic. Investigation will be paralyzed if arguments as to materiality or relevance, however
appropriate at the hearing, are to be transferred upon a doubtful showing to
the stage of a preliminary contest as to the obligation of the writ. Prophecy
in such circumstances will step into the place that description and analysis may
occupy more safely. Only where the futility of the process to uncover anything
legitimate is inevitable or obvious must there be a halt upon the threshold."
(Italics writer's.)

RECENT DECISIONS
Nerwal Realty Corp. v. 9th Avenue-31st Street Corp., et al., N. Y.
L. J., February 25, 1935.
A Court of Equity has power to appoint a receiver as an incident to its jurisdiction and such power is not dependent on any
statute.' The receiver has the right to collect the rent in advance,
pending the judgment by the court in the foreclosure action and the
sale which transfers ownership to the purchaser.2 The court cannot,
however, pending such transfer of ownership, terminate the rights of
the mortgagor under leases made by him or the rights of tenants to
the use and occupancy of the premises for a stipulated rental, so
long as their lessor's title has not been divested. 3
Where a tenant has paid rental in advance, as per his contract4
with the mortgagor, he cannot be compelled to pay occupational rent.
A tenant covenants for the right of quiet enjoyment,8 and upon eviction, actual or constructive, the covenant is broken.6 A wrongful
demand for rent, as in the case at bar, is such eviction,7 and where
a tenant is required to pay for use and occupation a sum beyond the
rents reserved in the lease to him, the necessary effect of an order
requiring it to pay for such use and occupation is to free it from
further obligation under its lease and constitutes a disaffirmance of
the lease.8 Therefore, the lease being terminated, the tenant was
free to negotiate a new lease with the receiver.
A. S. G.

PROCESS-DELIVERY OF SUMMONS TO SHERIFF FOR SERVICE-

SERVICE THEREOF BY INDIVIDUAL.-Plaintiff sued on a fire insurance
policy. The summons was delivered to the sheriff for service upon
defendant, pursuant to Civil Practice Act §171 within the time lim-

I Hollenbeck v. Donnell, 94 N. Y. 342 (1884) ; United States Trust Co. v.
N. Y. etc. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 478, 5 N. E. 316 (1886) ; Decker v. Gardner, 124
N. Y. 334, 26 N. E. 814 (1891).
2Keeney v. Home Ins. Co., 71 N. Y. 396 (1877); Prudence Co., Inc. 4.
160 W. 73d Street, 260 N. Y. 205, 183 N. E. 365 (1932); Markantonis v.
Madlan Realty Corp., 262 N. Y. 354, 186 N. E. 862 (1933).
'Ibid.
'Ibid.
Mygatt v. Coe, 147 N. Y. 456, 62 N. E. 17 (1895).
" Scriver v. Smith, 100 N. Y. 471, 3 N. E. 675 (1885) ; Shattuck v. Lamb,
65 N. Y. 499 (1875).
Giles v. Comstock, 4 N. Y. 270 (1850).
'Markantonis v. Madlan Realty Corp., supra note 2.
IN. Y. CIVI

PRAcTic AcT (1920) §17:
"An attempt to commence an action * ** is equivalent to the commencement thereof against each defendant, within the meaning of each
provision of this act which limits the time for commencing an action,
when the summons is delivered, with intent that it shall be actually

